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ABSTRACT
Vigenère Score for Malware Detection
by Suchita Deshmukh
Previous research has applied classic cryptanalytic techniques to the malware
detection problem. Specifically, scores based on simple substitution cipher cryptanal-
ysis and various generalizations have been considered. In this research, we analyze
two new malware scoring techniques based on classic cryptanalysis. Our first ap-
proach relies on the Index of Coincidence, which is used, for example, to determine
the length of the keyword in a Vigenère ciphertext. We also consider a score based
on a more complete cryptanalysis of a Vigenère cipher. We find that the Vigenère
score is competitive with previous statistical-based malware scores.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Like the poor in the famous Biblical verse, malware will always be with us.
Only six years after the launch of the first personal computer in 1975, the world
was presented with its first computer virus. Ever since, malware has seemed unstop-
pable. According to a 2014 report from Symantec, “[T]he release rate of malicious
code and other unwanted programs may be exceeding that of legitimate software ap-
plications [23].” According to F-Secure, “As much malware [was] produced in 2012
as in the previous 20 years altogether [5].” Malware [2] is an umbrella term for all
malicious software programs. Such programs are designed to harm computer users in
many ways, including stealing personal information, installing illegitimate software
on their systems, reformatting hard drives and deleting files, and so on. In this paper,
we use the terms viruses and malware interchangeably.
For many years, there has been an arms race between malware writers and anti-
virus software. The most common and widely used virus detection technique is signa-
ture detection [2]. In this technique, pattern matching is used to scan for particular
byte patterns that are found in viruses. If a matching pattern is found, the file is cat-
egorized as malware. This is a very simple and often effective technique, but malware
writers have developed various techniques aimed at defeating signature detection.
As the name suggests, the body of an encrypted virus is encrypted, which ef-
fectively defeats signature detection [26]. However, the decryption routine is not
encrypted, and this can be susceptible to signature scanning. As the next step in
this evolution, malware authors created polymorphic [26] and metamorphic virus [9].
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Like an encrypted virus, polymorphic virus also includes an encrypted body and de-
cryptor code. But in addition, polymorphic malware changes the decryption routine
with each new infection, making straightforward signature detection infeasible. How-
ever, anti-virus can use emulation to detect polymorphic malware—at some point the
malware will decrypt itself, at which point it will be vulnerable to signature detection.
Metamorphic virus are sometimes said to be “body polymorphic”, since they
morph the entire body of the malware with each new infection. This changes the
internal structure and, if sufficiently thorough, it will defeat signature scanning. En-
cryption is not necessary—and hence is not used—in metamorphic malware. Meta-
morphic code can employ a wide variety of code morphing strategies [21].
Proposed malware detection mechanisms can rely on static analysis or dynamic
analysis, or some combination thereof [1, 16, 19, 28]. In static analysis the necessary
features are extracted without executing the code. Examples of such features include
opcode sequences, entropy, and so on. As opposed to static analysis, dynamic analysis
extracts features by executing (or emulating) code. Dynamic features can be used to
determine aspects of the actual behavior of the code.
This research is based on static analysis of opcode sequences. We develop and
analyze software similarity measures that are designed to distinguish malware code
from benign code. Specifically, we focus on software similarity measures based on
cryptanalysis of the Vigenère cipher. This work was inspired by similar malware
research based on scores derived from simple substitution cryptanalysis [16] and a
generalization [19].
This report is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we briefly discuss previous
malware detection research that is based on classic cryptanalytic techniques. Chap-
2
ter 3 gives a succinct overview of the Vigenère cipher and cryptanalytic techniques
that are used to break the cipher. This chapter also discusses our scoring techniques
that are based on the cryptanalysis of this cipher. In Chapter 4, we present our ex-
periments and results. Chapter 5 concludes this report and we suggest some related
future work.
3
CHAPTER 2
Previous Research
This chapter presents previous research [16, 19] that forms a basis for our imple-
mentation of Vigenère score for malware detection. Even though the cryptanalytic
techniques used in the present research and previous research are different, they are
conceptually based on an idea of performing some cryptanalytic attack on cipher
techniques. Hence, it is necessary to understand the previous research techniques
before discussing the present research technique.
2.1 Simple Substitution Distance Tecnique
This first research technique [16] relies on a cryptanalysis of a simple substi-
tution cipher to classify a malware file from a benign file. The simple substitution
cipher [20] is one of the oldest classical cipher techniques, where each plaintext symbol
is encrypted with a ciphertext symbol, which is some displacement in the alphabet.
It is also known as a Caesar cipher, when a plaintext symbol is encrypted using
ciphertext symbol with a shift of 3. Consider an example given in Table 2 below
to understand the encryption of a message using a simple substitution key given in
Table 1.
Table 1: Simple Substitution Key with shift = 3
A B C D E F G H I J K L . . . S T U V W X Y Z
D E F G H I J K L M N U . . . V W X Y Z A B C
The naive approach in order to cryptanalyze the simple substitution ciphertext
can be an exhaustive search where an attacker has to try 287(26!/2) keys on an
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Table 2: Simple Substitution Encryption
Plaintext C R Y P T O G R A P H Y
Ciphertext F U B S W R J U D S K B
average to break a cipher, or a frequency analysis of ciphertext. In simple substitution
distance (SSD) paper [16], a Jackobsen’s algorithm [10], which is a faster algorithm
for the cryptanalysis of English ciphertext is analyzed and an analogous algorithm is
implemented for malware detection problem given in [16].
In Jackobsen’s algorithm [10], initially a digraph distribution matrix 𝐸 is calcu-
lated for a plaintext and a digraph distribution matrix𝐷 is calculated for a ciphertext.
For this initial 𝐷 matrix, a score is calculated using the formula given below:
Score =
∑︁
|𝑒𝑖𝑗 − 𝑑𝑖𝑗| (1)
Also, an initial key 𝐾 is guessed based on a frequency analysis of the ciphertext and
a putaive plaintext is obtained by deciphering the ciphertext using this initial key
𝐾. Again, a matrix 𝐷 is calculated for this putaitive plaintext and a new score is
computed using the formula(1). If the new score is better than the old one, the key
𝐾 is retained, else the key 𝐾 is modified by swapping its adjacent elements. With
this modified key 𝐾, again the ciphertext is decrypted and a matrix 𝐷 is recomputed
and a new score is obtained. This process continues till we obtain the best score for
which the best key 𝐾 is retained.
Consider an example explaining this process in detail. Suppose our alphabet set
consists of only five characters such as J, G ,S V, and P. Here, J is the most frequently
occurring character where as P is the least occurring character. The expected digraph
distribution matrix 𝐸 for the plaintext is given in Table 3. Suppose our ciphertext is
“GPSSPVJPSPSVJGSPJVJGSVSPVS” and our initial key 𝐾 is as shown in Table 4.
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Using this initial key 𝐾, we decipher a ciphertext to obtain a putative plaintext
“PGJJGSVGJGJSVPJGVSVPJSJGSJ” and calculate the digraph distribution matrix
𝐷 for this putative plaintext as shown in Table 5. We compute a score using these
two matrices 𝐸 and 𝐷. According to Jackobsen’s algorithm, the key 𝐾 is modified
in the next step and the score is recomputed. The key 𝐾 can be modified in the
several ways. The simplest method is to swap the first two elements of the key.
With this new putaitive key 𝐾, the putative plaintext obtained after decryption is
“PJGGJSVJGJGSVPGJVSVPGSGJSG” and its corresponding 𝐷 matrix is shown in
Table 6. On comparing Table 5 with Table 6, it is observed that for each modification
in the key, only the rows and columns of matrix 𝐷 are getting swapped. Thus, instead
of decrypting the ciphetext each time for a modified key, we can build matrix 𝐷 once
and only swap its rows and columns corresponding to the swap of the key elements.
Hence, it helps in reducing the complexity of the algorithm.
Table 3: Expected Digraph Distribution Matrix E
J G S V P
J 2 3 0 4 1
G 1 0 2 1 2
S 1 2 1 0 0
V 1 0 0 1 1
P 1 2 0 1 0
Table 4: Initial key
S P V J G
J G S V P
An analogous process for computing an opcode-based similarity measure for mal-
ware detection is implemented in SSD technique. In this technique, alphabet corre-
sponds to opcodes that are extracted from the malware files. A model is built for
a particular malware family and it is tested against an unknown file. The model is
6
Table 5: Digraph Distribution Matrix D
J G S V P
J 1 4 2 0 0
G 3 0 2 1 0
S 2 0 0 3 0
V 0 1 1 0 2
P 2 1 0 0 0
Table 6: Digraph Distribution Matrix D
J G S V P
J 0 3 2 1 0
G 4 1 2 0 0
S 0 2 0 3 0
V 1 0 1 0 2
P 1 2 0 0 0
treated as a original plaintext and an unknown file is treated as a ciphertext. For the
complete implementation details and the results of this technique refer [16]
2.2 Simple Substitution and Column Transposition Scoring Technique
In this second research [19], a scoring algorithm is implemented based on the
cryptanalysis of simple substitution and column transposition (SSCT) cipher. This is
a more generalized statistical analysis technique in comparison to SSD technique [16].
The cryptanalysis algorithm for scoring relies on a more sophisticated Jackobsen’s
algorithm mentioned in [29].We will first discuss the encryption process of SSCT
cipher and then consider the cryptanalysis of the encrypted text to obtain the original
message.
Suppose the plaintext we want to encrypt is “ATTACKATDAWN” and the sub-
stitution key and the transposition key are shown in Table 7 and Table 8 respec-
tively. After applying the substitution key in Table 7, the intermediate ciphertext is
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“DWWDFNDWGDZQ”. This intermediate ciphertext is arranged in the matrix shown
in Table 9. Using a transposition key, the final ciphertext “WDWFDNWDGZDQ” is
obtained from the intermediate ciphertext. The final ciphertext is then constructed
by reading the characters row-wise from the matrix given in Table 10.
Table 7: Substitution Key
A B C D E F G H I J K L . . . S T U V W X Y Z
D E F G H I J K L M N U . . . V W X Y Z A B C
Table 8: Transposition Key
2 1 3
Table 9: Intermediate Ciphertext Matrix
D W W
D F N
D W G
D Z Q
Table 10: Final Ciphertext Matrix
W D W
F D N
W D G
Z D Q
Now to obtain the original message from the SSCT ciphertext, an efficient crypt-
analysis algorithm outlined in [29] is used. The fundamental difference between SSD
and SSCT is that, in SSD the plaintext and the ciphertext are continuous stream of
characters while in SSCT the plaintext and the ciphertext are stored in the matrix
form. Suppose initial ciphertext matrix is as shown in Table 11. Then, we need to
compute digraph frequencies for every column based on the transposition key. Also,
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when this initial matrix is unwounded, the last element of row 𝑖 becomes adjacent to
the first element of row 𝑖+ 1. Hence, for a given transposition key,
𝐾 = (𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑘3, ...𝑘𝑛)
the digraph distribution matrix D is given by
𝐷 = 𝐷𝑘1,𝑘2 +𝐷𝑘2,𝑘3 + · · ·+𝐷𝑘𝑛−1,𝑘𝑛 +𝐷𝑘𝑛,𝑘1′
Here 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 is the digraph frequencies matrix when column 𝑗 is next to column 𝑖 and
𝐷𝑖,𝑗′ accounts for the digraph frequencies for the wrap around case. The required data
structure to store all these individual matrices is mentioned in [29]. If a Jakobsen’s
algorithm mentioned in [10] is applied directly in this scenario, then for each loop,
rows and columns of each individual 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 matrix needs to be swapped. This leads to
an increased time and space complexity. To avoid this, a smart approach is discovered
in [29], where instead of swapping rows and columns of an individual 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 matrix, rows
and columns of 𝐸𝑖,𝑗 matrix are swapped that yields the same score computed using
formula(1). Thus, the score is obtained by swapping rows and columns of 𝐸𝑖,𝑗 matrix
increasing an efficieny of an algorithm.
Table 11: Initial ciphertext matrix
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝑐11 𝑐12 𝑐13 . . . 𝑐1𝑛
𝑐21 𝑐22 𝑐23 . . . 𝑐2𝑛
...
...
... . . .
...
𝑐𝑚1 𝑐𝑚2 𝑐𝑚3 . . . 𝑐𝑚𝑛
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
In SSCT [19] scoring technique, the above mentioned process is applied to calcu-
late a score that classifies a malware file form a benign file. Like SSD [16] technique,
9
in this method also opcodes are mapped to English alphabets and an analogous algo-
rithm mentioned in [29] is implemented. The complete account of this method with
the results is outlined in [19].
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CHAPTER 3
Vigenère Cipher
Monoalphabetic substitution ciphers such as simple substitution cipher are easily
vulnerable to a frequency analysis attack [20]. This weakness of monoalphabetic sub-
stitution ciphers leads to the idea for designing a polyalphabetic cipher by Alberti [17].
He suggested that in order to make ciphertext more secure against potential cryptan-
alytic attacks, use two or more cipher alphabet and also switch between them during
encipherment. Alberti’s idea was converted into a more practical cipher by a French
diplomat, Vigenère and hence the name “Vigenère Cipher.” Vigenère cipher [17] is
a form of polyalphabetic substitution ciphers. Since Vigenère cipher overcome the
weakness in simple substitution cipher, it is considered to be stronger than Simple
Substitution cipher. It generates an encrypted text as an interwoven series of many
simple substitution ciphertexts thus disguising frequency statistics. And hence, this
has remained unbreakable for over three centuries, therefore it is also known as le
chiffre indéchiffrable (indecipherable). In Vigenère cipher, every letter in an alpha-
betic plaintext (message) is encrypted using a different shift that corresponds to a
corresponding letter in the keyword. This approach ensures one extra level of secu-
rity as compared to Simple Substitution where every letter in a message is encrypted
using the same shift.
3.1 Vigenère Encryption
To encrypt a plaintext message, a Vigenère square that is a 26 × 26 matrix is
used. The Vigenère square is shown in Figure 1. Each column index represents a
plaintext letter and each row index corresponds to a keyword letter.
11
Figure 1: Vigenère Square.
The encryption process is described using an example given in Table 12. In this
example, the keyword used for encryption is “LEMON.” This keyword is repeated
the length of the plaintext. A ciphertext letter L is obtained as an intersection of
row index that corresponds to keyword letter L and column index that corresponds to
plaintext letter A. In a similar fashion, all other letters of the plaintext are encrypted.
This example shows that every plaintext letter is encrypted using a different shift.
Since Vigenère cipher can easily disguise the frequency of appearance of letters, it is
more secure than Simple Substitution cipher.
Table 12: Vigenère Encryption
Plaintext A T T A C K A T D A W N
Key L E M O N L E M O N L E
Ciphertext L X F O P V E F R N H R
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3.2 Vigenère Decryption
The decryption process is exactly opposite to the encryption process. In this
process using a Vigenère square shown in Figure 1, a plaintext letter is retrieved by
fetching a row having a keyword letter as row index and a ciphertext letter in it.
Thus, the column index corresponding to the position of a cipher text letter in this
row provides a plaintext letter. See the example given in Table 13. Thus, to obtain
Table 13: Vigenère Decryption
Ciphertext L X F O P V E F R N H R
Key L E M O N L E M O N L E
Plaintext A T T A C K A T D A W N
a plaintext letter A first search for a row with row index L and within that row for
letter L, then find the corresponding column index. This column index represents
plaintext letter A. Similarly, the rest of the plaintext letters are obtained.
3.3 Breaking Vigenère Cipher
Although Vigenère cipher resisted any attack for almost three centuries, it was
broken because of the repetitive nature of its key used during encipherment. Like any
other polyalphabetic cipher, Vigenère cipher can hide natural letter frequencies for
plaintext letters. Hence, it is not very obvious to directly use frequency analysis for
cryptanalysis like simple substitution ciphers. It is difficult to draw any conclusions
about possible occurrence of plaintext letters. This is because, unlike simple substi-
tution cipher, the same plaintext letter gets enciphered as different ciphertext letter
at various points in the original message . For example if P is the most frequently
occurring letter in the ciphertext, then it will not represent E in the plaintext in case
of Vigenère cipher. This is because E can be encrypted as different cipher letters each
13
time.
In order to break Vigenère cipher, first find the key length, then divide the
ciphertext into those many number of columns and finally use frequency analysis to
solve an individual column, that is a simple shift cipher. With this process one can
recover an original key that can be used to decipher the ciphertext. There are two
methods to determine the length of the key: Kasisky test and Friedman test.
3.3.1 Kasisky Test
This method [17, 4] takes benefit of the fact that the repeated plaintext segments
may be encrypted using the same keyword letters, if they occur at the distance 𝑑.
Here 𝑑 ≡ 0( mod 𝑚), where 𝑚 is the length of key. The algorithm for this method
is as follows:
1. In a given ciphertext, search for pairs of identical words with length at least
three.
2. Calculate the distance between the two identical words as 𝑑1, 𝑑2,....., 𝑑𝑛.
3. Determine key length 𝑚 as 𝑚 divides gcd(𝑑1, 𝑑2, ..., 𝑑𝑛).
Consider the example in Table 14 to understand this method. Table 14 shows
that the distance between the identical words in the ciphertext is 8. Thus, according
to the algorithm, the most likely key length is 4. This method can produce more
accurate key length if the ciphertext used is sufficiently large so that there are more
occurrences of the identical words.
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Table 14: Kasisky Algorithm
Key K I N G K I N G K I N G K I N G K I N G K I N G
Plaintext T H E S U N A N D T H E M A N I N T H E M O O N
Ciphertext D P R Y E V N T N B U K W I A O X B U K W W B T
3.3.2 Friedman Test
This method [7] is based on the index of coincidence. The index of coincidence
determines the probability that the two randomly selected letters from the string
x, having n letters are identical. This test makes use of unevenness of the letter
frequencies in the cipher text to break the cipher. The index of coincidence (𝐼𝐶) is
given by formula below:
𝐼𝐶 =
𝑐∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑛𝑖(𝑛𝑖 − 1)
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/𝑐 (2)
Here, 𝑛𝑖 is the frequency of occurrence of a particular letter in the text
𝑁 is the length of the text
𝑐 is the total number of alphabet. for example 𝑐 = 26 for English
Further, the approximate key length is determined by a formula given as follows:
𝐾𝑝 −𝐾𝑟
𝐾𝑜 −𝐾𝑟 (3)
Here, 𝐾𝑝 is the kappa plaintext. For English 𝐾𝑝 = 0.067, if the underlying plaintext
for the ciphertext is English
𝐾𝑟 is the kappa random. For English 𝐾𝑟 = 0.0385, if the underlying plaintext for the
ciphertext is some random text
𝐾𝑜 is the 𝐼𝐶 calculated using Formula 2
In the context of the English language, if the 𝐼𝐶 of the ciphertext under con-
sideration is close to 0.067 (𝐾𝑝 for English), then the underlying plaintext for this
ciphertext is English. Also, if the 𝐼𝐶 of the ciphertext under consideration is close
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to 0.0385 (𝐾𝑟 for English), then the underlying plaintext for this ciphertext is some
random text. Note that this method only gives approximate key length. To obtain
more accurate key length ciphertext should be sufficiently large.
Once the key length is determined using either of the above methods, the actual
key is recovered using frequency analysis and correlation [20]. The correlation 𝜒 is a
given by the following formula:
𝜒 =
𝑐∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖 (4)
Here, 𝑛𝑖 is the letter frequencies for the observed column
𝑓𝑖 is the relative letter frequencies for English
𝑐 is the total number of alphabet. for example 𝑐 = 26 for English
The algorithm to obtain key is as follows:
1. Divide the ciphertext into same number of columns as the key length.
2. For each individual column, try out Caesar cipher decryption for all 26 (A-Z)
possible shifts.
3. Select a shift that produces highest correlation between letter frequencies for
the decrypted column and the relative letter frequencies for the normal English
text. This shift corresponds to a letter in a key.
4. Repeat step 2 and 3 for all remaining key letters.
5. Once the actual key is found, we can decrypt the ciphertext message using
decryption method mentioned above.
The above algorithm was initially implemented for English ciphertext to test
its efficacy. We have experimented with varying key lengths and varying sizes of
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ciphetext. It is observed that in order to completely recover the plaintext from ci-
phertext for a particular key length, each column of the ciphertext matrix should at
least contain 30 characters. For example, for a key “boxfish” of length 7, we obtained
a correct plaintext for a ciphertext of size 230 characters.
3.4 Vigenère Cipher Score for Malware Detection
This section describes the complete implementation of the scoring technique used
for the malware detection. The proposed techniques is shown in Figure 2. The
implementation involves two steps. The first step is computing key length with the
help of the index of coincidence technique [7]. This key length is used in the second
step to recover the key and decrypt the ciphertext to give putative plaintext using
this recovered key. The digraph distribution of this putative plaintext is used in the
scoring part that tells whether a particular file is malware or not. Before discussing
the above mentioned steps, it is necessary to talk about the process that involves
generation of alphabetic ciphertext from opcode sequence of a malware or benign file.
We will consider the opcode sequence from the known virus files as plaintext and
the opcode sequence from an unknown virus files as ciphertext. We will refer to all
virus files of the same family as model and unknown files to score as sample. After
extracting the opcodes from the virus files, these opcodes are mapped to the English
alphabet depending on the computed monograph statistics of a particular malware
family. Thus, the ciphertexts and plaintexts consist of the English alphabet. The
details about opcode extraction process, choice of 26 distinct opcodes and opcode to
alphabet mapping can be found in Chapter 4 under Experiments and Results.
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Figure 2: Flow Diagram of the Proposed Technique.
3.4.1 Score using Index of Coincidence
This is the first step that involves the computation of index of coincidence (𝐼𝐶)
for a model and various test samples which is further given to scoring function. 𝐼𝐶
for a model is referred as familyIC whereas 𝐼𝐶 for a sample is referred as 𝐼𝐶. The
formula for computing 𝐼𝐶 is given in (2). In order to compute familyIC, first a
set of all opcodes for all virus files in that family is obtained. Thus, according to
𝐼𝐶 formula(2), 𝑛𝑖 is frequency of occurrence of a particular opcode in that set and
𝑁 is total number of opcodes in the set. In a similar way, for an unknown file,
𝐼𝐶 is calculated. In case of an unknown file, 𝑛𝑖 is frequency of occurrence of a
particular opcode in that file and 𝑁 is the length of that file. Then a score function
is implemented as given in Table 15 that classifies a sample as malware or not. Also,
the obtained score is used as a key length in step 2 that is explained in the next
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section.
Table 15: Score using Index of Coincidence
Algorithm Parameters:
familyIC- Expected IC for a particular malware family
IC- Calculated IC for a test sample
score = |familyIC− IC|
if score ≤ threshold
unknown file is a virus of the same family
else
unknown file is not a virus of the same family
end if
3.4.2 Score using Vigenère Cryptanalysis
This is the second step that involves implementation of a scoring technique based
on the cryptanalysis [4] of ciphertext of test samples. The ciphertext for test samples is
assumed as some form of Vigenère encryption. This ciphertext is the opcode sequence
in the form of the English alphabet. This ciphertext along with its key length that is
obtained in section 3.4.1 is provided to a cryptanalysis subroutine given in Table 16.
The complete process for scoring a test sample is given below.
1. Generate ciphertext for a test sample in the form of the English alphabet.
2. Input the generated ciphertext and key length obtained using index of coin-
cidence to a cryptanalysis subroutine given in Table 16 .This cryptanalysis
subroutine has a findKey and decrypt functions that gives key and putative
plaintext respectively. The findKey function is given in Table 17.
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3. Compute normalized digraph distribution matrix E for original plaintext for a
model. The method is explained in Table 18.
4. Compute normalized digraph distribution matrix D for putative plaintext. The
process for computation of matrix D is same as matrix E. Both the matrices E
and D are normalized to avoid sparse matrices.
5. Input E and D matrices to a scoring function explained in Table 19.
6. This score determines whether a test sample is malware or not.
Table 16: Cryptanalysis Subroutine
Algorithm Parameters:
ciphertext, keyLength, putativePlaintext, key
if keyLength ≤ 0
putativePlaintext = ciphertext
else
key = findKey(ciphertext, keyLength)
putativePlaintext = decrypt(ciphertext, key)
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Table 17: findKey Function
Algorithm Parameters:
ciphertext, keyLength, putativePlaintext, key
FreqAlphaMapping - HashMap with alphabets as key and count of alphabets as value
monostat - monograph statistics for a particular malware family
Initialize key to 0
Initialize monostat to opcode frequences
Initialize row to 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ(ciphertext)/keyLength
Initialize col to keyLength
CT = generateCipherMatrix(ciphertext, row, col)
for each column in CT
freqCount = freq(column)
end for
for 𝑖 = 0 to 25
FreqAlphaMapping.put(65+𝑖, freqCount[𝑖])
end for
sort(FreqAlphaMapping)
Initialize maxCorr to 0
while loop < 26
corr = 0.0
𝑐 = 65 + loop
for 𝑗 = 0 to 25
𝑑 = (FreqAlphaMapping[𝑗].alpha− 𝑐+ 26) mod 26
corr = FreqAlphaMapping[𝑗].count * monostat[𝑑]
end for
if corr > maxCorr
𝑚 = loop
maxCorr = corr
end if
next loop
end while
key+ = m+ 65
end for
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Table 18: Compute 𝐸 Matrix
Algorithm Parameters:
Plaintext- Alphabetical plaintext generated for malware family
normFactor- One dimensional array holding total occurrences of opcodes per row
𝐸 Matrix- Normalized digraph distribution matrix for malware family
Initialize 𝐸 to 0
for 𝑖 = 1 to Length of plainetxt
𝐸[Plaintext.𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑡(𝑘 − 1)− 65][Plaintext.𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝐴𝑡(𝑘)− 65]+ = 1
end for
for 𝑗 = 1 to 26
for 𝑘 = 1 to 26
normFactor[𝑗]+ = 𝐸[𝑗][𝑘]
end for
end for
for 𝑖 = 1 to 26
for 𝑗 = 1 to 26
if normFactor[𝑖] ̸= 0
𝐸[𝑖][𝑗] = 𝐸[𝑖][𝑗]/normFactor[𝑖]
end if
end for
end for
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Table 19: Score using Vigenère Cryptanalysis
Algorithm Parameters:
𝐸 Matrix- Normalized digraph distribution matrix for malware family
𝐷 Matrix- Normalized digraph distribution matrix for test sample
for 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛
for 𝑗 = 1 to 𝑛
score[𝑖][𝑗] = |𝐸[𝑖][𝑗]−𝐷[𝑖][𝑗]|
score+ = score[𝑖][𝑗]
end for
end for
if score ≤ threshold
unknown file is a virus of the same family
else
unknown file is not a virus of the same family
end if
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CHAPTER 4
Experiments and Results
This chapter illustrates the experiments and the results obtained via implementa-
tion of the scoring algorithm in Java. Initially, the gathered executable files from both
malware and benign dataset were disassembled using ollydbg [14]. Then the opcodes
from these disassembled files were extracted using GivemeASM3.jar. The various
malware families used for experimentation and the results of these experiments are
explained in the subsequent sections.
4.1 Parameters
It is mentioned in [15] that there are more than 130 opcodes in any particular
processor. Thus, if a matrix is constructed for scoring using such opcodes, it will
be too large to compare. Moreover, only a subset of opcodes out of all such opcodes
contributes to a particular behavior of a file, that is either malicious or benign. Hence,
it is appropriate to choose only frequently occurring opcodes and put all non-frequent
opcodes into “other” category to build 𝐸 and 𝐷 matrices for scoring. To come up
with such topmost occurring opcodes, an experiment was conducted over 643 files
from Zbot, Winwebsec and Cygwin datasets. The purpose of this experiment was to
choose top 𝐾 opcodes which contribute to most of the functionality. A graph given in
Figure 3 is plotted between number of opcodes on X-axis and AUC values on Y-axis
to find such 𝐾 opcodes. It was seen from the Figure 3 that 𝐾 = 25 gives the highest
AUC value. Thus, in both of the above mentioned approaches, total 26 opcodes were
used to conduct experiments. These 26 opcodes consists of 25 frequently occurring
opcodes and all non frequently occurring opcodes grouped into “other" category.
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Figure 3: No. of Opcodes vs AUC
4.2 Dataset
The dataset used for this project consists of malware dataset and benign dataset.
The malware dataset includes various malware families such as Next Generation Virus
Generation Kit (NGVCK), Harebot, Zeroaccess, Zbot, Security Shield, Winwebsec,
Smart HDD, Cridex. These families are described succinctly below:
∙ NGVCK [25] is a metamorphic virus that replicates itself using code morphing
techniques such as subroutine reordering and dead code insertion.
∙ Harebot is a windows rootkit that opens up the user system to remote hackers
allowing them to perform malicious activities.
∙ Zeroaccess is a trojan horse that mainly infects Microsoft Windows OS. It down-
loads other malware on an infected computer system with the help of botnets
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that are mainly used in bitcoin mining and click frauds.
∙ Zbot [24] is also known as Zeus, designed to carry out malicious and criminal
tasks such as stealing banking information of users using techniques such as
form grabbing and keystroke logging.
∙ Security Shield [11] is a variant of Win32/Winwebsec family that generates fake
warnings about nonexistent threats and asks users to register to paid software
to remove these threats.
∙ Winwebsec [12] is a type of malicious software that targets Windows users.
It generates fake alerts and detections in order to convince users to purchase
illegitimate software that impersonates legitimate anti-virus software.
∙ Smart HDD is a malicious program that represents itself as a hardware mon-
itoring system and generates misleading warning for hard drive failures and
memory errors.
∙ Cridex [13] is a trojan that adds the compromised system to the network of
botnets and injects itself into victim’s web browser to collect confidential infor-
mation such as banking credentials.
Since all the above mentioned malicious programs are mainly designed for win-
dows platform, it is logical to use benign files belonging to the same environment for
scoring. Thus the benign dataset used consists of Cygwin utility files. The Table 20
shows total number of files in the malware and benign dataset. Since there are fewer
number of files in each dataset, we performed a five-fold cross validation to get most
out of it. We divided each malware dataset into five sets; four out of five sets are used
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for training and the remaining one set is used for testing. This process is repeated
five times, each time selecting different sets for training and testing.
Table 20: Dataset
NGVCK 200
Harebot 54
Zeroaccess 230
Zbot 242
Security Shield 59
Winwebsec 161
Smart HDD 69
Cridex 75
Cygwin 40
4.3 Results
The similarity scores obtained using the scoring algorithms mentioned in Chap-
ter 3 for the comparison of various malware families with virus files in the same family
and the benign files are described in this section. The results are shown in terms of
AUC values. The AUC values [3] are obtained by plotting Receiver Operating Curve
(ROC). The ROC [6] is a plot between false positive rate on the X-axis and true
positive rate on the Y-axis. The accuracy of our detection system is calculated using
AUC that is an area under ROC curve. Table 21 shows comparison between our
detection system and previous research. Graphically this comparison is shown in
Graph 4. It can be seen from Graph 4 that our detection system performed better
in case of malware families such as NGVCK, Zbot and Smart HDD. In case of an
NGVCK malware family, Scatter plot in Figure 5 reveals a clear distinction between
malware files and benign files. In Figure 5, the blue solid dots corresponds to malware
files where as orange solid dots corresponds to benign files. Hence, we got an AUC
of perfect one for NGVCK which is an ideal condition and is shown in ROC curve in
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Table 21: Results
Malware AUC using AUC using AUC using AUC using
Family IC score Vigenère Cryptanalysis score SSCT SSD
NGVCK 1 0.99 1 1
Zbot 0.8801 0.9729 0.8670 0.8664
Winwebsec 0.8914 0.9996 0.7328 0.8374
Smart HDD 0.6146 0.9958 1 0.8855
Cridex 0.825 0.9458 0.9628 0.5830
Security Shield 0.7167 0.5979 1 0.6290
Harebot 0.6989 0.9057 1 0.5606
Zeroaccess 0.8029 0.6588 N/A N/A
Figure 4: AUC Comparison
Figure 6. For Zbot, the AUC value is better than both previous research techniques.
In case of Smart HDD, the AUC value is closer to AUC value of SSCT technique
but better than AUC value of SSD technique. In almost all cases, our technique is
performing better than the SSD technique and in some case it reaches closer to SSCT
technique as mentioned above. We tested our detection system for one more family,
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Figure 5: NGVCK Scatter Plot
Figure 6: NGVCK ROC
Zeroaccess, which is not considered in SSCT and SSD techniques. Even though the
results obtained for this family are not very good, we have still included them in our
result set for comparison in the future. For better visualization of the results, the
scatter plots and ROC curves for the rest of the malware families for both scoring
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algorithms are given in the Appendices A and B.
4.4 Results for Varying Key Lengths
We know that our approach II scores are dependent on the key lengths obtained
during approach I. These are approximate key lengths and thus we wanted to check
if varying the key lengths can improve the approach II scores. We experimented on
harebot malware family since it can be an interesting case to see if its auc value
improves from 0.9057. We used the key length one lesser as well as one greater than
the actual key length for all harebot test samples. The results of these experiments
are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8. It is observed that there is no change in the
auc value when the key length is greater than the actual key length and it slightly
improved when the key length is lesser that the actual key length. Moreover, the same
experiments can be conducted for the remaining malware families under consideration
in the future.
Figure 7: Harebot ROC for lesser key length
30
Figure 8: Harebot ROC for greater key length
4.5 SVM Results
SVM [22] is an acronym for support vector machine, is used as a binary classifier.
It is a supervised learning technique that means it needs labelled data. Due to the fact
that SVM acts as a classification technique, it is very natural to apply the technique
to a set of scores, as opposed to a raw data itself. Hence although, it is a challenging
task to determine a good technique to combine scores to build a strong score, SVM
is a reasonable technique to combine such scores rather than using an ad hoc score
combination. Therefore, in our case we used SVM to combine our approach I and
approach II scores. We tested two kernel functions such as polynomial and Gaussian
with different parameters to determine the accuracy of our classification technique.
The results for our experiments is shown in Table 22. In the Table 22, the parameters
P and C are known as the degree of a polynomial learning function and the trade-off
between a training error and a margin respectively. It is observed that a gaussian
kernel function with parametr C=3 gives a better accuracy in all cases.
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Table 22: SVM Results
Family Kernel Accuracy
Cridex
Polynomial (P=2, C=0) 73.39%
Polynomial (P=2,C=3) 77.06%
Gaussian (C=0) 75.23%
Gaussian (C=3) 79.82%
NGVCK
Polynomial (P=2, C=0) 50.00%
Polynomial (P=2,C=3) 53.12%
Gaussian (C=0) 100.00%
Gaussian (C=3) 100.00%
Harebot
Polynomial (P=2, C=0) 80.00%
Polynomial (P=2,C=3) 21.00%
Gaussian (C=0) 81.00%
Gaussian (C=3) 88.00%
Winwebsec
Polynomial (P=2, C=0) 84.51%
Polynomial (P=2,C=3) 90.85%
Gaussian (C=0) 90.14%
Gaussian (C=3) 90.85%
Security Shield
Polynomial (P=2, C=0) 78.43%
Polynomial (P=2,C=3) 21.57%
Gaussian (C=0) 83.33%
Gaussian (C=3) 87.25%
SmartHDD
Polynomial (P=2, C=0) 89.62%
Polynomial (P=2,C=3) 98.11%
Gaussian (C=0) 98.11%
Gaussian (C=3) 98.11%
32
CHAPTER 5
Conclusions and Future Work
We modeled and implemented an opcode-based static analysis technique for mal-
ware detection. This technique uses a scoring algorithm based on cryptanalysis of
Vigenère cipher [4]. We built a training model from a dataset of various malware
families mentioned in Section 4.2 and tested this model against virus files from the
same malware family as well as benign files. We tested our scoring algorithm on wide
range of malware families in order to analyze their reaction for our scoring technique.
This algorithm proves to be efficient in almost all cases of malware families as com-
pared to SSD. In comparison to SSCT, our algorithm performed better in case of
NGVCK, Zbot and Smart HDD. Thus, for a particular threshold value, our detection
technique effectively classifies a malware file from a benign file.
Presently, our detection system is only able to distinguish a malware file from a
benign file. In future, this detection technique can be modified to classify a test file
to a particular malware family it belongs based on higher level calculations of index
of coincidence values. Also, in this project morphed variants of the virus files are not
analyzed. This could be a future scope, where one can build a morphing engine [18]
to create a morphed variants of virus files using the dataset used in this project and
analyze how our technique performs. Although, our second scoring technique based
on complete Vigenère cryptanalysis is performing better than the SSD technique, it
is not doing well compared to the SSCT technique in all the malware families. Hence,
in future our approach II scores can be improved by implementing an automated
approach which will consider varying key lengths, as opposed to only approximate
key lengths, which are presently used.
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APPENDIX A
Scatter Plots and ROC curves on the basis of Index of Coincidence
In this section, we present the scatter plots and ROC curves for the various
malware families scored on the basis of Index of Coincidence. When performing the
experiments on the malware families mentioned in Section 4.2, we stored the malware
and benign scores in .txt files and used these score to plot scatter plots as shown in
Figures A.9 − A.15. Using these score, we further calculated true positive and false
negative rates to generate ROC curves given in Figures A.16 − A.22 to obtain AUC
values.
Figure A.9: Cridex Scatter Plot
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Figure A.10: Harebot Scatter Plot
Figure A.11: Security Shield Scatter Plot
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Figure A.12: Smart HDD Scatter Plot
Figure A.13: Winwebsec Scatter Plot
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Figure A.14: Zbot Scatter Plot
Figure A.15: Zeroaccess Scatter Plot
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Figure A.16: Cridex ROC
Figure A.17: Harebot ROC
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Figure A.18: Security Shield ROC
Figure A.19: Smart HDD ROC
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Figure A.20: Winwebsec ROC
Figure A.21: Zbot ROC
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Figure A.22: Zeroaccess ROC
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APPENDIX B
Scatter Plots and ROC curves on the basis of Vigenère Cyptanalysis
In this section, we present the scatter plots and ROC curves for the various
malware families scored on the basis of Vigenère Cyptanalysis. The scatter plots are
shown in Figures B.23 − B.30 and ROC curves are given in Figures B.31 − B.38.
Figure B.23: NGVCK Scatter Plot
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Figure B.24: Cridex Scatter Plot
Figure B.25: Harebot Scatter Plot
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Figure B.26: Security Shield Scatter Plot
Figure B.27: Smart HDD Scatter Plot
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Figure B.28: Winwebsec Scatter Plot
Figure B.29: Zbot Scatter Plot
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Figure B.30: Zeroaccess Scatter Plot
Figure B.31: NGVCK ROC
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Figure B.32: Cridex ROC
Figure B.33: Harebot ROC
50
Figure B.34: Security Shield ROC
Figure B.35: Smart HDD ROC
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Figure B.36: Winwebsec ROC
Figure B.37: Zbot ROC
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Figure B.38: Zeroaccess ROC
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